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Dispatch and Delay: Post Conviction Relief Act
Litigation in Non-Capital Cases
Donald J. Harris
Kim Nieves
Thomas M. Place*
I. INTRODUCTION
State court post conviction delays have been the object of much
dismay, but little study. Indeed, one entire stage of these proceed-
ings-trial court collateral review-has not been quantitatively
examined at all. Few question the importance of a timely and fi-
nal adjudication in criminal cases. For the innocent or illegally
sentenced defendant, delays exacerbate the miscarriage of justice.
In the absence of a legitimate claim, successive and lengthy re-
views of a conviction or sentence forestall closure for both the vic-
tim and the community.
. This article reports on decision times in trial court proceedings
for collateral relief, and is the first study of its kind. It employs a
range of empirical methods for systematically measuring litigation
times, and presents a descriptive analysis of the factors accelerat-
ing or impeding disposition. The article is divided into four sec-
tions. The first section summarizes the legal and historical con-
text of the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), the statutory vehi-
cle for pursuing collateral relief in Pennsylvania. The second sec-
tion describes our research methodologies and is followed by the
results of the statistical and qualitative analysis. The final sec-
tion is a summary of findings and recommendations.
* Don Harris is the Policy and Research Director at the Administrative Office of
Pennsylvania Courts, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Kim Nieves is a Research Analyst
at the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts. Thomas Place is a Professor of Law at
the Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University. The views expressed
herein are the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the Unified Judicial
System of Pennsylvania.
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II. THE LAW OF PCRA
States began adopting post conviction procedures in the 1950's
in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Young v. Ragen.' In Young, the Court held that the doctrine of
exhaustion of state court remedies under federal habeas corpus
"presupposes that some adequate state remedy exists"' by which
state prisoners "may raise claims of denial of federal rights."3 Ini-
tially, some states judicially construed their writ of habeas corpus4
as a means of permitting defendants to raise federal constitutional
challenges to their convictions, while others expanded the writ of
coram nobis.' A small number of states enacted post conviction
procedures that were either influenced by the ABA Standards Re-
lating to Post Conviction Remedies6 or were modeled after the
Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act.7 Others adopted post
conviction procedures by rule of court.8 In 1965, the Supreme
Court in Case v. State of Nebraska9 stated that because of the
great variations in the scope and availability of such remedies,
state post conviction remedies were "entirely inadequate." ° The
Court urged the states to adopt comprehensive statutes enabling
prisoners to test their federal constitutional claims in the state
courts and thereby reduce the conflict between federal and state
1. 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
2. Id. at 239.
3. Id.
4. See e.g. Rice v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1963); Ex parte Bush, 313 S.W.2d 287
(1958); Huffman v. Alexander, 251 P.2d 87 (1952); Sewell v. Lainson, 57 N.W.2d 556 (1953).
Habeas Corpus is a writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to en-
sure that the party's imprisonment is not illegal. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed.
1999).
5. See e.g. People v. Monahan, 217 N.E.2d 664 (1966); In re Chapman, 273 P.2d 817
(1954); State ex rel. McManamon v. Blackford Circuit Court, 95 N.E.2d 556 (1950). See also
Richard B. Amandes, Coram Nobis - Panacea or Carcinoma, 7 HASTINGS L.J. 48 (1955);
Edwin W. Briggs, Coram Nobis, 17 MONT. L. REV. 160 (1956). Coram nobis is a writ of
error directed to a court for review of its own judgment and predicated on alleged errors of
fact. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 338 (7th ed. 1999).
6. See STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES (ABA 1967).
7. See UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURES ACT (1955); see e.g. MD. ANN. CODE,
art. 27 § 645Ao645J; MINN. S.A. § 590.01-590.06 (1967); MONT. C.A. 46-21-101 to 46-21-203;
ORE. REV. STAT. § 138.510-138.680 (1968). See also Meador, Accommodating State Crimi-
nal Procedure and Federal Post Conviction Review, 50 A.B.A.J. 928, 929-30 (1964).
8. ALASKA Sup. CT. RULE 35(b); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. PROC. RULE 35, Del. C. Ann.;
FLA. RULES CRIM. PROC. 1, F.S.A. ch. 924 Appendix; KY. RULES CRIM. PROC. 11.42; Mo.
SUP. CT. RULE 27.26, V.A.M.R.; N.J. CRIM. PROC. RULES OF SUPER. AND COUNTY CTS., Rule
3:10A-2.
9. 381 U.S. 336 (1965).
10. Id. at 338.
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courts. More specifically, Justice Brennan in a concurring opinion
called for the adoption of state post conviction procedures that
were "swift... simple and easily invoked,"" sufficiently "compre-
hensive to embrace all federal constitutional claims"" and "eschew
rigid and technical doctrines of forfeiture, waiver or default."3 At
the time Case was decided, collateral relief in Pennsylvania was
limited to the writ of habeas corpus'4 and, to a lesser extent, the
writ of coram nobis.5 In response to significant increases in the
number of post conviction challenges and the lack of a uniform
process to hear and decide such claims, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in 1965 called for legislation establishing a "process for
hearing and determining alleged violations of federal constitu-
tional guarantees." 6 In 1966, the Legislature enacted the Post
Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA)." The PCHA provided a compre-
hensive procedure to hear and decide challenges to convictions
obtained and sentences imposed "without due process of law."8
In 1988, the PCHA was modified in part, repealed in part and
renamed the Post Conviction Relief Act. 9 The PCRA narrowed
the grounds upon which post conviction relief could be obtained by
limiting relief to "persons convicted of crimes they did not commit
and serving illegal sentences."" The PCRA was amended in 199521
11. Id. at 346-347.
12. Id. at 347.
13. Id.
14. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 14. For a discussion of common law habeas corpus in Penn-
sylvania, see Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 213 A.2d 613, 619-23 (Pa. 1965).
15. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Orsino, 178 A.2d 843, 846 (Pa. 1962) (stating purpose of
writ of coram nobis is to correct errors of fact only); Commonwealth v. Fay, 439 A.2d 1227,
1228-29 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (explaining expansion of scope of writ of coram nobis in
Pennsylvania to include matters of law not previously before court); Commonwealth v.
Ditmore, 363 A.2d 1253, 1256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (emphasizing traditional limited scope
of writ of coram nobis).
16. Myers, 213 A.2d at 619-20.
17. See Pa. Laws 1580, 1580-84 (codified at 19 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1180-1 to 1180-12,
and recodified as amended at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9541-9551 (1982)). See Elizabeth L.
Green, Student Author, Habeas Corpus and the 1966 Post Conviction Hearing Act: Major
Pennsylvania Remedies in Criminal Cases, 39 TEMPLE L.Q. 188, 203-06 (1966) (summariz-
ing changes in habeas corpus law under PCHA).
18. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9542 (repealed 1988).
19. See 1988 Pa. Laws 336; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9541-46 (West 1988).
20. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9542.
21. See 1995 Pa. Laws 1118 (became effective January 16, 1996). The amendments
also established the Capital Unitary Review Act, which replaced post appeal collateral
review in capital cases. On August 11, 1997, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court perma-
nently suspended Sections 9570 to 9579 of the Capital Unitary Review Act pursuant to its
authority under Article V, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court also
suspended Section 9545(c)(3), relating to limitations periods where a stay of execution is
granted, Section 9545(d)(2), relating to discovery, and the 1995 and 1997 amendments to
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to require, subject to several narrow exceptions, that a post con-
viction petition must be filed within one year of the date the de-
fendant's judgment becomes final." In 2002, the Legislature fur-
ther amended the PCRA by authorizing post conviction DNA test-
ing.
23
The PCRA establishes a procedure for defendants to collaterally
attack their conviction or sentence. It is not a substitute for the
appeal process.24 Rather, the PCRA permits a defendant to raise
specific challenges to his or her conviction that were not consid-
ered by either the trial or appellate court. A PCRA petition may
only be filed after a defendant has waived or exhausted his direct
appeal rights. 5
Unlike the PCHA, the PCRA provides that it "shall be the sole
means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other
common law and statutory remedies... including habeas corpus." "
The PCRA has been broadly interpreted as creating a unified
statutory framework for reviewing claims that were traditionally
cognizable in habeas corpus thereby avoiding a bifurcated system
in which some claims are considered outside the framework of the
PCRA."7 Where a defendant's post conviction claims are "cogniza-
ble under the PCRA, the common law and statutory remedies now
subsumed by the PCRA are not separately available to the defen-
Section 9546(a) of the PCRA concerning review of orders in death penalty cases. In Re:
Suspension of the Capital Unitary Review Act and Related Sections of the Act of 1995-32
(SSI), 722 A.2d 676, 678-79 (Pa. 1999). In Commonwealth v. Sanders, 743 A.2d 970 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1999) the Superior Court rejected challenges to the validity of the 1995 Amend-
ments based on allegations that the legislation exceeded the scope of the Governor's proc-
lamation of designated subjects to be addressed during the 1995 Special Session. In doing
so, the court reasoned that the legislature's consideration of the PCRA statute was proper
in light of the Governor's proclamation seeking revisions of the criminal statutes of the
Commonwealth.
22. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9545(b). In 1997, the Legislature amended the custody section
of the Act precluding relief unless the defendant is in custody at the time relief is granted.
Act of June 25, 1997, P.L. 324, No. 33, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(1).
23. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543.1 (2002).
24. Comment, PA. R. CRIM. P. 901.
25. Commonwealth v. Fralic, 625 A.2d 1249, 1252, n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
26. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9542. Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 721 (1997);
Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242, 1250-51 (Pa. 1999).
27. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1995) (ineffectiveness of coun-
sel in failing to protect defendant's right to direct appeal); Commonwealth v. Chester, 733
A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1999) (claims arising during penalty phase of capital trial cognizable under
PCRA); Commonwealth v. Padden, 783 A.2d 299 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (claim that counsel
was ineffective for failing to assert rights under the Rules of Criminal Procedure presents a
cognizable claim under the PCRA).
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dant."2' The writ of habeas corpus continues to exist "only in cases
where there is no remedy under the PCRA.""9
Relief under the PCRA is not available unless the defendant is
in custody at the time the petition is filed and at the time relief is
granted." Unlike the PCHA, the PCRA does not "provide relief
from collateral consequences of a criminal conviction."'
To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, a defendant must es-
tablish by preponderance of the evidence that his/her conviction or
sentence resulted from one or more of the PCRA's specifically
enumerated errors or defects. Under the PCRA, a defendant may
obtain relief if the conviction or sentence resulted from a violation
of the Pennsylvania Constitution or the Constitution or laws of the
United States where the error "undermined the truth determining
process.""2 Cognizable constitutional claims include the prosecu-
tion's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence," violations of Bat-
son v. Kentucky,' failure to prove the elements of the offense be-
yond a reasonable doubt35 and improper remarks by prosecutors
during closing argument. 6
Ineffective assistance of counsel is a basis for relief under the
PCRA where counsel's act or omission "so undermined the truth
determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or inno-
cence could have taken place."37 Ineffectiveness claims raised in a
post conviction proceeding are governed by the same standard
that applies when such a claim is presented on direct appeal.8 To
be eligible for relief, a defendant must establish both inadequate
performance by counsel and prejudice. In addition to trial errors,
28. Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. 1999).
29. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. 1998).
30. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(1); Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 683 A.2d 632 (Pa.
Super. 1991) (en banc), affd, 699 A.2d 718 (Pa. 1997). Relief under the PCRA is not avail-
able unless the defendant is in custody at the time the petition is filed and when relief is
granted.
31. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9542.
32. § 9543(a)(2)(1).
33. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Galloway, 640 A.2d 454 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
34. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges).
See e.g., Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 733 (Pa. 2000).
35. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Hanes, 579 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Com-
monwealth v. Perlman, 572 A.2d 2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
36. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Lassen, 659 A.2d 999 1011 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
37. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).
38. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (Pa. 1999) (rejecting heightened
standard for ineffectiveness in PCRA proceeding and concluding that the language in the
PCRA is the equivalent to the prejudice requirement applied by the federal courts to both
direct and collateral review under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has construed the PCRA to pro-
vide relief where counsel is ineffective at the penalty phase of a
capital case, 9 fails to protect the defendant's right to direct ap-
peal4 ° or provides ineffective assistance of counsel in a post convic-
tion proceeding.41 A defendant may seek relief under the Act
where his/her plea of guilty was unlawfully induced," where the
Commonwealth obstructed the defendant's right of appeal,43 and
on the basis of newly discovered evidence that has "subsequently
become available and would have changed the outcome if it had
been introduced."'  Pursuant to a 2002 amendment, the PCRA
establishes a mechanism for defendants to seek DNA testing of
available evidence and for the court to consider whether such evi-
dence would have changed the outcome of the trial.45 Relief may
also be sought under the PCRA where the sentence imposed is
greater than the lawful maximum46 or where a court did not have
jurisdiction to act.47 The PCRA precludes relief for claims that
could have been previously litigated on direct appeal or raised in a
previously filed post conviction proceeding.48 The PCRA cannot be
used to re-litigate a previously litigated claim under the guise of
ineffective assistance of counsel or by "presenting new theories of
relief to support previously litigated claims." 9 Nor is relief avail-
able under the PCRA where the claim has been waived." A claim
is waived if the defendant could have raised the issue at trial, on
appeal, or in a prior post conviction proceeding but failed to do
so. 1 The waiver rule applies to claims of error alleging a constitu-
tional violation, 2 ineffective assistance of counsel53 and claims re-
39. Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1999).
40. Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999).
41. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1998) (enforceable right to effective
counsel appointed pursuant to PA. R. CRIM. P. 904).
42. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(2)(iii).
43. § 9543(a)(2)(iv).
44. § 9543(a)(2)(vi).
45. § 9543.1 (2002).
46. § 9543(a)(2)(vii).
47. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 9543(a)(2)(viii).
48. §§ 9543(a)(3); 9544(a).
49. Commonwealth v. Christy, 656 A.2d 877, 881 (Pa. 1995); Commonwealth v.
Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 358 (Pa. 1995); Commonwealth v. McCall, 786 A.2d 191 (Pa.
2001).
50. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(3); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9544(b).
51. § 9544(b).
52. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Menhart, 796 A.2d 990 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
53. In Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002) the Court changed its long-
standing rule that an ineffectiveness claim was waived if it was not raised at the first op-
portunity in which the allegedly ineffective counsel no longer represents the defendant. See
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garding unlawful inducement of a guilty plea. Not subject to the
waiver rule are claims regarding the obstruction of the appellate
process and discovery of exculpatory evidence since a post convic-
tion petition is the only remedy to present the claim. Also not sub-
ject to the waiver rule is a claim that the sentence exceeds the
lawful maximum or that the proceeding occurred before a court
that did not have jurisdiction. 4 The PCRA permits a court to hear
a waived claim if failure to pursue the claim in the prior proceed-
ing was a result of ineffective assistance of counsel.5 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has recently ruled that new counsel on
direct appeal is not required to raise claims of ineffectiveness of
trial counsel and that such claims are not waived if raised for the
first time in a PCRA proceeding.56 The doctrine of "relaxed
waiver" is limited to direct appeal in capital cases and does not
extend to appeals from the denial of post conviction relief.57
As noted, the 1995 amendments to the PCRA established a one-
year filing period with exceptions for newly-discovered evidence,
where the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials or when the right asserted is
a newly-recognized constitutional right that has been held to ap-
ply retroactively.58 The PCRA requires that any petition invoking
an exception to the one-year period shall be filed within sixty days
of the date the claim could have been presented.59 The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has held that the time limits under the Act
are jurisdictional and, therefore, the period for filing is not subject
to the doctrine of equitable tolling."0 A claim of ineffectiveness of
counsel does not save an otherwise untimely PCRA petition,6' nor
is untimeliness excused because the defendant did not have access
to legal materials to file a pro se petition62 or was mentally ill dur-
e.g. Commonwealth v. Griffin, 644 A.2d 1162, 1170 (Pa. 1994). In Grant, the Court held
that new counsel appointed for direct appeal is not required to raise claims of ineffective-
ness of trial counsel. Such claims, the Court held, are not waived if presented for the first
time in a PCRA petition.
54. Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 639 A.2d 1235, 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Common-
wealth v. Butler, 566 A.2d 1209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
55. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(4).
56. Grant, 813 A.2d at 726 (Pa. 2002).
57. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. Tilley, 780
A.2d 649 (Pa. 2001).
58. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9545(b).
59. § 9545(b)(1), (2).
60. Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (1999).
61. Commonwealth v. Carr, 708 A.2d 1164 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
62. Commonwealth v. Barrett, 761 A.2d 145 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
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ing the one year filing period." Failure to timely file a petition
precludes a court from considering a challenge to the legality of a
sentence unless the petition is timely filed under one of the excep-
tions to the time period."
The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure 900 - 909 govern
the filing and disposition of PCRA proceedings. With the excep-
tion of Pa.R.Crim. 909 governing capital cases, the Rules do not
impose time limits on the parties or the court. Under the PCRA, a
defendant must file a pro se petition before counsel will be ap-
pointed." Once the petition is filed, under Rule 904, a defendant
filing an initial petition is entitled to appointment of counsel with-
out regard to the merits of the petition." In capital cases, upon
conclusion of direct review, the trial court is required to appoint
new counsel for purposes of PCRA review unless the defendant
waives counsel or decides to proceed with prior counsel.67 In the
usual case, appointed counsel will prepare and file an amended
petition in conformity with Rule 902 governing the contents of a
PCRA petition. Post conviction counsel may seek to withdraw if
counsel determines that the issues raised in a post conviction pro-
ceeding are without merit. Counsel must submit a "no-merit" let-
ter to the court listing each issue the defendant wishes to pursue
and an explanation why the defendant's issues are without
merit.
6 18
The PCRA court can dismiss an initial petition without a hear-
ing upon notice to the defendant if there are no genuine issues
raised by the petition and the court concludes that the defendant
is not entitled to relief. 9 An evidentiary hearing is required only
where the Commonwealth moves to dismiss on grounds that the
petition is untimely or where the petition raises material issues of
fact.7" Upon deciding the case, the court must advise the defen-
dant of his/her right to appeal.7
63. Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 781 A.2d 140 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
64. Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201 (Pa. 2000).
65. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9545(a). Once the petition is filed, under Rule 904, a defen-
dant filing a first petition is entitled to appointment of counsel without regard to the merits
of the petition.
66. Commonwealth v. Kutnyak, 781 A.2d 1259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
67. PA. R. CRIM. P. 904(F).
68. Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988).
69. PA. R. CRIM. P. 907.
70. PA. R. CRIM. P. 908.
71. PA. R. CRIM. P. 908(E).
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III. DATA COLLECTION
The central policy goal of the PCRA is to establish a procedure
for the prompt, meaningful review of claims for collateral relief.
Translating this goal into a set of research questions requires
some conceptual groundwork. The variable case processing time is
an objective measure of the amount of time (days or months)
taken by a case as it proceeds through the court system. It en-
compasses both the necessary and inefficient use of time."2 The
categories dispatch and delay-which imply necessary and ineffi-
cient, respectively-are context-specific judgments based on the
type of litigation, characteristics of the court, the governing court
rules and the specific features of the case.
Because PCRA litigation takes place in stages, a breakdown of
case processing times by stage of litigation helps to clarify the
analysis of necessary and inefficient use of time. Trotter and Coo-
per's review of empirical studies of trial court case processing
times found that research typically focuses on the overall time be-
tween the initial filing and final disposition of a case, without re-
gard to the intermediate activities.7" As a consequence, recom-
mendations geared to shortening the time to disposition may over-
look qualitative distinctions between different stages in the case.
At distinct points along the trajectory of post conviction proce-
dures, the defense attorney, the Commonwealth attorney, and the
judge exchange primary responsibility for expediting or inhibiting
events. The subdivision of cases into specific stages of litigation
closely correlates activities with actors, and distinguishes specific
areas of case progress that may be amenable to intervention.
A. Surveys
With this framework in mind, the authors developed an initial
survey (Survey I) to answer three questions of interest:
(1) how many PCRA petitions are pending statewide in the
Pennsylvania courts of common pleas?
(2) how long have those petitions been pending?
72. M.L. Luskin and R.C. Luskin, Why So Fast, Why So Slow?: Explaining Case Proc-
essing Time. 77 J. CRIM. L.& CRIMINOLOGY. 190 (1986).
73. J. Trotter and C. Cooper, State trial court delay: Efforts at reform. 31 AM.U.L. REV.
213, 236 (1982).
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(3) what factors affect the progress of a PCRA case at each
stage of the litigation?
Common pleas court judges were asked to list each post convic-
tion petition currently pending on his or her docket, the original
filing date of the petition, the current stage of litigation, and any
specific problems associated with the case. The survey question-
naire also was designed to categorize each pending petition by its
current stage of litigation and to identify the most common case
processing problems. The questionnaire was sent to half of the
common pleas court judges in Pennsylvania, selected at random,
on June 15, 2000.
Based on the responses to this initial survey, Survey II was de-
veloped to elicit more information about stage categorization and
the problems related to delay. Survey II also asked the judges to
distinguish between capital and noncapital cases, and to report
the dates on which an amended petition or Finley letter74 was
filed. Survey II was mailed on September 1, 2000 to the remain-
ing 50 percent of common pleas court judges statewide.
Of the total 472 questionnaires mailed in Surveys I and II, 95
percent of the judges responded. The surveys provided a quantita-
tive "snapshot" of nearly all PCRA petitions pending statewide.
The preliminary findings suggested three directions for the next
phase of the research:
(1) conduct a series of in-depth interviews with judges, prac-
titioners, and other experts to learn more about the problems that
affect the pace and quality of PCRA litigation;
(2) collect a sample of disposed PCRA petitions to complement
the pending case data in Surveys I and II. The additional sample
would provide useful information regarding case outcomes and
would help complete the picture of the PCRA case processing
times; and
(3) analyze death penalty and non-death penalty PCRA cases
separately as the two areas of litigation appear to be qualitatively
different. This article is limited to non-capital cases.
74. When counsel seeks to withdraw in a post conviction proceeding, the motion to
withdraw must be accompanied by a "no merit" letter. Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d
213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
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B. Interviews
Judges reported the types of problems associated with each case
on the surveys, but many of the notations were not specific enough
to discern the exact mechanisms of delay. For example, judges
reported "inaction of defense counsel" as a typical problem.
Though clear from the surveys that the problem was pervasive,
less certain was how defense inactivity contributed to delay or
even how to identify "defense inactivity." We explored these is-
sues, and the details of local PCRA practice, in semi-structured
interviews with defense lawyers, Commonwealth attorneys, ad-
ministrative and support personnel, and judges throughout the
state.
C. Additional Data Collection
In Surveys I and II the judges reported each PCRA case pending
on their dockets at the time of the survey. By calculating the time
between the original filing date of the petition and the survey due
date, the age of each case was determined. Procedural stage was
adduced from the status codes and other case information on the
surveys.
The results revealed that, overall, a third of the cases had been
pending more than a year, and a fifth had been pending more than
two years. But is the processing time of a group of cases fully de-
scribed by the age of pending cases? And how many cases are
dismissed or denied, how many are granted relief, and what types
of relief are granted? To pursue these questions, follow-up data
were collected in Philadelphia, Delaware, and Allegheny Counties.
The methods of collecting the additional data for each county are
described below.
In Delaware County, PCRA cases tended to feature shorter
overall times to disposition, prompting us to take a closer look.
The Office of Judicial Support (OJS) provided us with a copy of
their detailed log of all petitions filed from January 1, 1998 to
February 15, 2001 (number of PCRA petitions = 227). The log in-
cluded information on cases that were both pending and disposed.
For Allegheny County, a database was created that included all
cases reported by judges on Surveys I and II (number of petitions
= 230). Follow-up data for these cases were gathered directly from
the county's electronic docket, the Integrated Criminal Informa-
tion System (ICIS). Because the follow-up data were collected
months after the survey data, many of the petitions reported as
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pending on Surveys I and II had been disposed of. Disposition
dates and outcomes were added to the database.
Philadelphia County was selected for further research because
of its unique method of judicial assignment. It also has the largest
PCRA caseload in the Commonwealth. At the time of the survey,
in Philadelphia County all non-homicide PCRA cases were as-
signed to one PCRA judge, and all PCRA homicide cases were as-
signed to the sentencing judge.75 Therefore, a majority of PCRA
cases appeared on one judge's docket and were processed through
a single, designated courtroom. Due to the volume of cases on the
one docket, the Philadelphia PCRA judge was not asked to com-
plete a manual survey. Rather, information about these cases was
collected from the Philadelphia District Attorney's database of all
cases (homicide and non-homicide) filed from January 1, 1996 to
April 26, 2001 (number of PCRA petitions = 5,215). The database
included cases that were both pending and disposed.
IV. STATISTICAL AND INTERVIEW FINDINGS
This section summarizes the quantitative data from Surveys I
and II together with the interviews with judges, court-appointed
defense attorneys, public defenders, district attorneys, adminis-
trators and support personnel. The findings are presented by
stage of litigation.
A. An Introduction to the Graphics
Instead of average case processing time, the figures presented in
the following sections show case processing times in months at the
2 5th
, 
5 0 th and 7 5 th percentiles. Extremely old cases will make an
average (mean) appear much higher than the typical case. PCRA
data are especially vulnerable to this problem as some petitions
await disposition for very long periods of time. Dividing the cases
into quartiles according to age provides a more representative pic-
ture of the middle range of cases without the distorting effects of
extremes or outliers.
75. As of March 5, 2001, Philadelphia County changed its judicial assignment proce-
dures. Two judges have been assigned to address the backlog of existing cases in the PCRA
court. All incoming petitions are now assigned to the sentencing judge. This report looks
at cases in the Philadelphia PCRA court prior to this change, as it will take some time to
determine the efficacy of the new program.
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The left bracket in the sample figure refers to the 25th percen-
tile. The 5 0 h percentile, or the median, is signified by the dot.
The right bracket refers to the 75th percentile, and above it falls
the oldest quartile of cases.
B. Stage I: Appointment of Counsel, Finley Practice and
Amended Complaint
Figure 1: Months pending for Stage I cases
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Based on the information provided on Surveys I and II, all ac-
tive non-capital PCRA petitions were classified into one of three
procedural stages. Stage I petitions were defined as awaiting first
appointment of counsel or awaiting counsel's submission of an
amended petition or Finley letter. The survey data indicated that
statewide (excluding Allegheny and Philadelphia Counties), 213 of
the 601 active non-capital PCRA petitions (36%) met the criteria
for Stage I. Half of these cases were pending more than four
months, and a quarter were pending more than nine months. In
Allegheny County, 132 of the 230 active non-capital cases (57%)
were Stage I. Of these, half were pending longer than nine
months, more than twice as long as Stage I cases in the statewide
sample, and one in four petitions had been active longer than 17
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months. Philadelphia County had a similar distribution: of the
974 active non-capital cases available for stage analysis, 814 peti-
tions (84%) were classified as Stage I. Half were pending more
than 10 months, and a quarter were older than 17 months. See
Figure 1.
Stage I covers several procedural steps. The sections below de-
scribe the litigation problems reported by practitioners at each
step.
1. Assignment of Counsel and Initial Review of Petition
An indigent defendant who files a first petition for post convic-
tion relief is entitled to counsel,7 regardless of the merits of the
petition7 or the timeliness of its filing.78 When a second or subse-
quent petition is filed, counsel is appointed only if an evidentiary
hearing is required.79 Once appointed, counsel must determine
whether the petition was timely filed and, if not, whether any of
the exceptions to the filing period apply. Assuming a timely filed
petition, counsel must determine whether the defendant is enti-
tled to relief under the Act.
Defense attorneys emphasize that they cannot competently
evaluate the merits of a case until all relevant records are ac-
quired, including court files and transcripts of proceedings. In
some cases these records are years old and are not readily avail-
able for review. Obtaining the court file and transcripts from the
archives appears to be a chronic source of delay throughout the
state. Some counties store old records at off-site facilities, making
it time-consuming to retrieve pertinent materials. In the Phila-
delphia off-site storage facility, the slim court file and the bulky
notes of testimony are stored separately to save space, and defense
counselors report problems in recovering both halves. Allegheny
County respondents report that acquiring the records necessary to
prepare an amended petition or a petition to withdraw may take
over six months. This may help to explain why one quarter of the
cases awaiting an amended petition or a petition to withdraw had
76. PA. R. CRIM. P. 901(A).
77. Commonwealth v. Kaufmann, 592 A.2d 691, 675 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
78. Commonwealth v. Guthrie, 749 A.2d 502 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
79. Our pending case data include both first and subsequent petitions. As case process-
ing times were found to be similar for both types of petitions, separate analyses are not
reported.
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been pending over 17 months in Allegheny and Philadelphia
Counties.
Untimely transcription of records also poses a problem as many
PCRA petitions are filed following entry of a guilty plea, a pro-
ceeding not routinely transcribed. In Delaware County, the court-
rooms are equipped for electronic recording, lessening dependency
on harried court reporters. One Delaware County respondent es-
timates that the electronic recording unit provides transcription
directly to counsel within a few weeks of the request. Another
observes that transcription may take up to three months.
Getting records from other sources can be difficult as well. Re-
spondents advise that trial and appellate counsel are at times re-
luctant to provide PCRA counsel with records and information
about their representation of the defendant. Some report coopera-
tion by the district attorney's office in sharing records; others state
that the district attorney's office does not respond to requests for
records. Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(e) precludes formal discovery in non-
capital cases except upon leave of court after a showing of excep-
tional circumstances.
Difficulties in obtaining records occur frequently enough that a
few counties have worked out alternative systems. In Philadel-
phia County, a local rule provides that "...if notes have not been
received in three months after the PCRA unit has submitted an
order for transcription, counsel is to assume the notes will never
be available and should proceed without them."0 In Allegheny
County, a similar practice has evolved. The prosecutors contend
that defense counsel will sometimes file an amended petition be-
fore obtaining the case files and transcripts. In such cases, the
Commonwealth may seek to dismiss the amended petition pursu-
ant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(12), which requires that a petition con-
tain the facts supporting each claim and where those facts appear
in the record. To address the problem of timely access to records,
some Allegheny County judges attach an order for transcription to
the order appointing counsel in the hope of facilitating the record
review process.
While counsel/petitioner face-to-face interviews are not re-
quired,8 defense lawyers report that their investigation of claims
is hindered by limited access to the incarcerated client. The client
80. PHILADELPHIA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE GUIDE 7, Revised July 27, 1998.
81. Commonwealth v. Torres, 630 A.2d 1250 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
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may be able to provide information about witnesses counsel chose
not to call at trial, describe events not included in the record, and
otherwise assist verification of his claims. In many cases, the cli-
ent is housed in a remote state correctional institution while his
appointed attorney is based in the county of the conviction. Each
county uses a different system of prisoner transportation and few
jurisdictions have the resources to transport defendants to meet-
ings with their attorneys. As a result, written correspondence is
usually the only means of communicating with the petitioner.
Weeks taken to write and receive letters extend the time required
to evaluate the pro se petition.
Magnifying the difficulties at the initial stage is the inexperi-
ence of many of the attorneys appointed to PCRA cases. Generally
speaking, the appointments do not pay well, and the more sea-
soned attorneys tend to avoid them." Administrators and judges
report that inexperienced attorneys are less skillful in gaining co-
operation from the clerical support offices, a necessity for recover-
ing hard to locate files and transcripts. Lack of experience also
impairs the ability of PCRA counsel to secure information and re-
cords from trial and appellate counsel and to engage in informal
discovery with the prosecution.
2. Finley Letters
Counsel may seek to withdraw from a case if (a) counsel deter-
mines that the claim(s) raised by the petitioner have no merit and
review of the case reveals no meritorious issues or (b) the petition
is untimely and does not meet one of the exceptions to the filing
period. Counsel seeking to withdraw from a PCRA case must
submit a "no merit" or "Finley" letter stating the nature and ex-
tent of counsel's review, a list of claims that the petitioner seeks to
have reviewed, and an explanation why the claims are without
merit."
Excluding Allegheny and Philadelphia Counties, an analysis of
filing dates indicates that in most instances Finley letters were
filed within four months of the pro se petition. In Allegheny
82. The selection and compensation of PCRA counsel varies with judicial district. Most
often, jurisdictions rely on individual judge-appointments where attorney qualifications are
discretionary. Others appoint from a court-approved list with minimum eligibility re-
quirements, and a few employ "contract counsel," an arrangement where PCRA cases are
assigned to a small group of attorneys who have successfully bid on the work.
83. Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A-2d 213 (Pa.Super. Ct. 1988).
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County, half of the Finley letters were filed within eight months.
However, for 25 percent of the cases, more than a year elapsed
before the filing of the Finley letter. In Philadelphia, filing dates
for Finley letters were only available for non-death penalty homi-
cide cases. As with Allegheny, half the Finley letters filed in
homicide cases in Philadelphia were submitted within eight
months of the pro se petition. In 25 percent of the cases, Finley
letters were not filed for nearly two years.
Following the submission of a Finley letter, the court must con-
duct its own independent review of the record. According to re-
spondents, adherence to the Finley process varies. In Philadel-
phia County, respondents say that submission of a Finley letter is
an increasingly unpopular action. If the court agrees with counsel
that the claims are meritless, the court must serve the defendant
with notice of its intention to dismiss the petition and state in the
notice the reasons for the dismissal.' The petitioner then has 20
days to respond to the proposed dismissal. Following the peti-
tioner's response, the judge may ask counsel to submit an
amended Finley letter.85 The amended Finley letter must provide
additional explanation and detail as to why it would be fruitless to
pursue the petitioner's claim(s). Counsel report that the work in-
volved in preparing the original and amended Finley letters occa-
sionally equals or exceeds the time involved in preparing an
amended petition. Counsel is permitted to withdraw if the court is
persuaded that the claims presented by the petitioner are merit-
less.86
Another possible "deterrent" to filing a Finley letter is the per-
ceived risk that the defendant, if he disagrees with counsel's con-
clusion that the claims presented are meritless, will file a com-
plaint with the Disciplinary Board. The Board is the agency of the
Supreme Court charged with investigating the conduct of practic-
ing attorneys in Pennsylvania.87 Board statistics indicate that for
the one-year period covering April 2002 to March 2003, 437 PCRA-
related complaints were filed, an amount equal to nine percent of
the total 4,979 complaints received by the Board.88 Not all of the
PCRA-related complaints involve disagreements over no-merit
84. PA. R. CRIM. P. 907(1).
85. See Commonwealth v. Mosteller, 633 A.2d. 615 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
86. Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988).
87. PA.R.D.E. 205.
88. Personal communication from Disciplinary Board counsel, April 2003.
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letters; however, the Board reports that where such a disagree-
ment is the basis of the complaint, no action will be taken by the
Board.
3. Amended Petitions
Pa.R.Crim.P. 905 authorizes amendment of a petition for post
conviction relief by leave of court and provides that the amend-
ment is to be freely allowed. Leave to amend is regularly sought
where the petition is filed pro se and counsel is appointed pursu-
ant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 904. The content of a petition for post convic-
tion relief is governed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A). The Rule requires
detailed information about the defendant's conviction or guilty
plea, sentence, prior proceedings initiated by the defendant and
the nature and grounds for relief requested and the facts support-
ing each ground for relief. With the exception of cases where
counsel is required to file an amended Finley letter, the time asso-
ciated with preparing amended petitions is markedly longer than
that associated with Finley letters. See Figure 2. In Allegheny
County, amended petitions take six months longer to prepare than
Finley letters when measured at the median.
Figure 2: Months pending from the filing of the pro se peti-
tion to the submission of a Finley letter or amended peti-
tion
S tatew ide
Finley Letter [" ]
Amended Petition [E I
Finley Letter
Amended Petition
Finley Letter
Amended Petition
t I I I I i
o 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
MONTHS
Allegheny
E* 3
I II I I I I I
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
MONTHS
Philadelphia
E 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 75
MONTHS
Spring 2003 Post Conviction Relief Act Litigation 485
Respondents report that the time difference can be explained by
the additional defense activities required to prepare an amended
petition. For example, if a request for an evidentiary hearing is
included in the petition, Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(15) specifies that the
request must be accompanied by a signed certification as to each
intended witness, the substance of the witness' testimony and any
documents material to that testimony. Defense counsel may be
required to seek funds from the court to hire a private investigator
to locate witnesses. The investigation, location and certification of
multiple witnesses, or the investigation of newly discovered evi-
dence is time consuming, particularly if the petition raises multi-
ple claims for relief.
Once drafted, the amended petition must be verified by the in-
carcerated petitioner.89 If the petitioner is not incarcerated locally,
the process usually occurs by mail. The verification request may
prompt an exchange of correspondence between the defendant and
counsel about the amended petition.
C. Stage II: Answer and Court Review
Once an amended petition is filed, a case enters the second
stage of litigation. Stage II marks the shift in litigation activity
from the defense counsel to the district attorney and the court.
During Stage II, the Commonwealth's answer or motion to dismiss
is prepared. If defense counsel has submitted a no-merit letter,
the primary event is the court's independent review.
Figure 3: Months pending for Stage II cases
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Stage II has fewer procedural steps than Stage I, and, at the
median, only adds about three to four months to the overall case
processing time. See Figure 3. Statewide (excluding Allegheny
89. PA. R. CRIM. P. 902.
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and Philadelphia), 243 cases were classified as Stage II. From the
date of initial filing of the pro se petition, the median age of Stage
II cases. was eight months, and the 75th percentile was 13 months.
Of the 41 Stage II cases in Allegheny County, half were pending
for 12 months, while one in four was older than 27 months. Phila-
delphia County, with 106 homicide petitions in Stage II, had
slightly shorter time frames at the upper range. The median was
13 months and the 75th percentile was 19 months.
1. Commonwealth Response
Across the state, prosecutors report that although the district
attorney offices receive notification from the clerk of courts or re-
ceiving unit when a pro se petition is filed, they do not address
post conviction petitions until an amended petition is filed. If de-
fense counsel's Finley letter is accepted by the court, the Com-
monwealth usually does not get involved in the case resulting in
shorter case processing times. There are occasions, however,
when the court may order the Commonwealth to submit a re-
sponse pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 906. The response by the Com-
monwealth is usually a motion to dismiss.
Among the Allegheny County disposed cases (n = 114), the
Commonwealth filed 66 responses which represents 58 percent
(66/114) of the total. The median time between the date the
amended petition or Finley letter was filed and the date of the
Commonwealth's response was one month. At the 7 5th percentile,
the elapsed time was three months. The data from Allegheny
County suggest that the preparation of the Commonwealth's re-
sponse is not a source of delay.9"
By contrast, Delaware County prosecutors filed an answer or
motion to dismiss in only 11 percent (18/164) of the disposed cases.
The rationale given for the low rate is that answers constrain the
ability to respond to issues that may be presented in supplemental
amended petitions.
Philadelphia County follows an altogether different system. If
defense counsel files an amended petition, a court listing is sched-
uled 30 days after the filing date, at which time the Common-
wealth must declare whether it agrees to an evidentiary hearing
or whether it will file an answer,9' and then has 60 days to do so
90. In 15 cases, the filing date of the Commonwealth's response was missing.
91. PHILADELPHIA PCRA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, July 1993, revised July 1998.
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after that appearance. If the Commonwealth does not submit an
answer or motion to dismiss in the 60-day time frame, the matter
is categorized as a "status" case until the response is filed.
2. Dismissal Without a Hearing
The court may dismiss a petition without a hearing where ei-
ther a Finley letter has been filed and the court has conducted its
own independent review of the record or if the court determines
that there are no genuine issues of material fact presented in the
petition, amended petition or answer and the defendant is not en-
titled to relief.92 Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) requires the judge to notify
the defendant of the intention to dismiss the petition. The defen-
dant has 20 days to respond. If no response is received, or the
substance of the response has no bearing on the merits of the case,
the judge will dismiss the petition." Some defense and district at-
torneys question the necessity of the procedure that grants the
petitioner a right to respond to a proposed dismissal. According to
one district attorney, there is rarely substance in the petitioner's
uncounseled response that has not already been presented in the
amended petition. A defense lawyer notes that if the petitioner
files a response, the case might remain under advisement with the
judge, at times for a protracted period, ultimately delaying the
petitioner's appeal of the dismissal. In Allegheny County, of the
230 cases, 98 notices to dismiss were issued (43%). Twenty-six of
those petitioners (27%) submitted a response and of those, 16
(16%) were denied or dismissed. The remaining ten response
cases were still pending at the end of the study. At the median,
the procedure adds only a fraction of a month. See Figure 4.
Of the 227 Delaware County cases, 55 notices to dismiss were
issued (24%). Twenty-five percent (14/55) of petitioners submitted
a response. Sixty-four percent (9/14) of the response cases were
denied or dismissed, and the remaining 36 percent (5/14) were still
pending at the end of the study. At the median, the procedure
added five months in Delaware County.
4
92. PA. R. CRiM. P. 907(1).
93. When the petition is dismissed without a hearing, the court must advise the defen-
dant of the right to appeal and the time within which the appeal must be taken. PA. R.
CRIM. P. 907(4).
94. Notice of dismissal dates were not available for Philadelphia County.
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Figure 4: Months pending from notice to dismiss
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D. Stage III: Hearing and Disposition
Entry into Stage III signifies the transition from attorney
preparation to case disposition by the court. The principal events
of this stage are the evidentiary hearing and the court's decision-
making.
Figure 5 depicts pending times for Stage III cases. The cumula-
tive effects of delay are apparent. Statewide (excluding Allegheny
and Philadelphia), half of the Stage III cases were pending for 10
months or longer from the filing of the pro se petition, while a
quarter of the cases were older than 18 months. In Allegheny
County, 50 percent of the Stage III cases had been pending longer
than 16 months, and 25 percent were older than 37 months. In
Philadelphia County, half of the Stage III cases were older than 19
months, and one in four were older than 38 months.
Figure 5: Months pending for Stage III cases
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A comparison of Figure 3 with Figure 5 shows that, in most ju-
risdictions in Pennsylvania, the typical case spends about two
months in Stage III. In Allegheny and Philadelphia Counties, it is
five months and six months, respectively. At the 75th percentile,
the time frames are at least doubled.
1. Evidentiary Hearing
If the petition, amended petition or the Commonwealth's answer
raises issues of material fact, the judge will schedule an eviden-
tiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing also may be scheduled if
the Commonwealth has filed a motion to dismiss based on the un-
timely filing of the petition.95 At the hearing, the defendant has
the burden of establishing that his conviction or sentence resulted
from one or more of the Act's specifically enumerated errors or
defects, and that the claims have not been waived or previously
litigated. The judges interviewed differ in their views on the need
for a hearing on the merits. Some state that all timely first peti-
tions are granted an evidentiary hearing.96 By providing the de-
fendant an evidentiary hearing, the judges believe they were de-
creasing the likelihood of second and subsequent petitions. Other
judges report that evidentiary hearings are granted in about half
the cases or less.
The defendant is entitled to be present at the evidentiary hear-
ing and will often testify. Respondents report that securing the
attendance of the incarcerated petitioner is a recurrent source of
delay at the evidentiary hearing stage. The "bring-down problem,"
as it is called in Philadelphia County, refers to a shortage of
county jail space available to house inmates transported from re-
mote state correctional facilities. For example, in Philadelphia as
jail population numbers fluctuate from day to day, officials will
routinely disregard court orders to produce Philadelphia post con-
viction defendants if there is no bed space available. In both
Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties, inmates attending trial are
given priority for transportation and housing over inmates in-
volved in PCRA litigation. Because of this practice, a PCRA case
may be listed four or five times before a defendant is brought to
95. PA. R. CRIM. P. 908(a)(1).
96. These particular judges, all from different jurisdictions, report that defense counsel
do not submit Finley letters, and so either a petition is dismissed as untimely or an eviden-
tiary hearing is granted.
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the courthouse. Successive postponements of the evidentiary
hearing due to transportation or housing problems can add three
months or more to the duration of a case, a factor that may help to
explain the longer Stage III times in Philadelphia.97 Also, the
PCRA judge may continue the evidentiary hearing to provide ei-
ther party a reasonable opportunity for investigation and prepara-
tion of emergent issues, and may order briefs and argument to
address such issues.
98
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the judge can issue
a ruling from the bench or take the case under advisement. Most
judges say they issued a bench ruling "rarely" or "never." Of those
judges that do not rule from the bench, about half stress the im-
portance of writing an opinion following the evidentiary hearing.
These judges feel that an opinion saves time in the long run by
preparing the work that will be needed for the "inevitable" appeal.
Judges also believe that if a petitioner receives a written opinion
setting out the rationale for the denial/dismissal of his claims, the
petitioner is less likely to file a second or subsequent petition. To
assist in preparing the opinion, the judge may request that coun-
sel prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
2. Disposition
An analysis of disposed petitions in Allegheny, Delaware and
Philadelphia Counties (n = 3,948) found that less than two percent
resulted in a grant of a new trial or sentencing hearing. An addi-
tional nine percent had their appellate rights restored. Relief was
denied in 87 percent.99 The frequency of outcomes by county was
generally consistent.
97. Recently, Philadelphia has begun using video-conferencing to alleviate the "bring-
down" problem.
98. PA. R. CRIM. P. 908(B).
99. Disposition information was unavailable for one case in Allegheny County, one case
in Delaware County, and 103 cases in Philadelphia County.
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TABLE 1: Frequency of PCRA disposition types by county
Allegheny Philadelphia Delaware
Denied/dismissed 94 (81.9%) 3,174 (87.0%) 149 (90.3%)
Reinstatement of 16 (13.8%) 341 (9.3%) 1 (0.6%)*
appellate rights
New trial granted 1 (0.9%) 1 (0.0%) 1 (0.6%)
Sentence vacated 1 (0.9%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.6%)
Granted 0 (0.0%) 6 (0.2%) 0 (0.0%)
(type unknown)
Petition withdrawn 2 (1.7%) 48 (1.3%) 12 (7.3%)
Missing 1 (0.9%) 98 (2.7%) 1 (0.6%)
Total Disposed 115 (100%) 3,668 (100%) 165 (100%)
* The comparatively low percentage of reinstatements of appellate rights in Delaware
County raises the question of whether these dispositions are included in the "petition with-
drawn" category.
E. Appeal to Superior Court
If the petition for post conviction relief is denied, the petitioner
may elect to appeal the PCRA court's decision. In calendar year
2000, 968 PCRA decisions were appealed in the Superior Court.'00
Based on the approximately 1,207 PCRA petitions filed in the trial
courts in 1999, the PCRA appeal rate is estimated at nearly 80
percent. PCRA appeals comprise about 12 percent of the Superior
Court's docket in 2000.
V. CONCLUSION
A review of the scholarly literature reveals that this is the first
empirical study of trial court collateral relief litigation in any
United States jurisdiction. As the sole vehicle for obtaining collat-
100. PCRA appeals data provided by the Legal Systems Department, Superior Court of
Pennsylvania.
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eral relief, the PCRA is an essential protection for defendants and
the last opportunity for the state court to ensure quality of justice.
It is therefore surprising that PCRA practice has received so little
attention.
Across Pennsylvania, it is not unusual to find PCRA cases that
have been pending for two, three, or even four years. Numerous
instances of dispatch can be found as well, but the norms and cul-
ture of post conviction delay are both deeply rooted and wide-
spread in the Commonwealth. Only Philadelphia County has ac-
knowledged the extent of the problem with systematic reform.
Though it is too early to determine the long-term benefits of the
new Philadelphia system, court officials report that major obsta-
cles such as the "bring-down" problem and case backlog are being
addressed.
The findings of this research disclose two major sites of litiga-
tion delay in PCRA cases. In Stage I, a thicket of administrative
and procedural problems associated with the preparation of an
amended petition impedes case progress and prolongs the overall
time to disposition. While experienced defense counsel can over-
come many of these obstacles, a concern expressed statewide, ex-
clusive of Philadelphia, was the appointment of inexperienced at-
torneys to PCRA cases.
Stage III is the other major locus of delay. Once pleadings and
briefs have been submitted and the case is ready for decision,
whether by notice to dismiss or by hearing on the merits, the time
to decision can be significant. The multiple steps of Stage I pro-
vide many opportunities for delay, but the decisional delay at
Stage III is more difficult to explain. In part, the volume of cases
assigned to each judge requires the setting of work priorities. In
the course of this research, it was common for attorneys, judges
and staff to assert that the disposing of post conviction petitions is
less urgent than the termination of other matters on the docket.
The low status of PCRA petitions derives, in part, from the
shared perception among the bench and bar that most post convic-
tion claims are frivolous. Moreover, the mass of claims is thought
to absorb a disproportionate share of the court's resources. The
data reported in Table 1 lend a qualified measure of support to
this perception. With the exception of a small group of cases that
result in restoration of the petitioner's right to direct appeal, fewer
than two percent of all petitioners are granted relief.
In view of the above, recommendations to improve the celerity
and quality of PCRA litigation are more likely to succeed, particu-
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larly in the long-term, if the incentives-to trial judges, attorneys,
and court reporters-are redirected to elevate PCRA matters in
the judicial scale of priorities. The bench and bar must provide
active leadership in recognizing the fundamental justice concerns
addressed by the PCRA and modify procedures accordingly. To-
ward that end we proffer the following recommendations:
(1) The PCRA court should enter an order directing the tran-
scription of notes of testimony at the time counsel is appointed in
the matter.
(2) Because PCRA counsel is required to review thoroughly the
performance of trial counsel and, in many cases, the decisions
made by direct appeal counsel, courts should only appoint experi-
enced counsel in PCRA cases. Attorneys with only minimal ex-
perience in criminal trial and appellate work should be appointed
only where the attorney has completed a CLE course on post con-
viction practice.
(3) In order for PCRA counsel to raise all claims that may enti-
tle the defendant to relief, it is essential for PCRA counsel to meet
with trial and direct appeal counsel to obtain the defendant's file
and to discuss prior counsel's representation of the defendant. To
this end, bar organizations can play an important role in helping
defense lawyers understand that potential claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel are not a basis for refusing to assist PCRA
counsel.
(4) Effective communication between PCRA counsel and the
defendant is essential in order for counsel to determine the valid-
ity of claims and to prepare an amended petition, if appropriate.
The judiciary should take the lead in developing protocols with the
state Department of Corrections to provide PCRA counsel with
reasonable telephone access to petitioner.
(5) Courts must work with the county prisons and the sheriffs'
departments to ensure that defendants are transported in a timely
manner and that space is available in the county prisons to house
defendants.
Nearly forty years ago, Justice Brennan called on states to
adopt post conviction procedures that were "swift and simple..."1°1
and "fair and just.... ,,102 The first goal can be achieved, the authors
believe, if modest administrative changes are made by courts to
facilitate prompt access by counsel to records, to develop proce-
101. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 345-347 (1965) (Brennan, J. concurring).
102. Id. at 344.
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dures in conjunction with the Department of Correction that en-
able counsel to communicate more efficiently with their incarcer-
ated clients, and to work with the county prisons and the sheriffs'
departments to resolve transportation and housing problems for
defendants pursuing PCRA relief. Clearly less modest is the sub-
stantive recommendation that experienced or specifically trained
counsel be appointed in PCRA cases and the call for greater coop-
eration between PCRA counsel and prior counsel. However, the
authors believe that these changes are necessary in order for
Pennsylvania to achieve the goal of a "fair and just" post convic-
tion procedure.
